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The U.S.–Mexico border is experiencing
an era of unparalleled trade and exchange. But
at a time when legal flows of goods and people
are at historical highs, so are illegal cross-border
flows of undocumented migrants. Illegal immi-
gration from Mexico became more common in
the late 1960s, following the end of the Bracero
Program in 1964. The Bracero Program allowed
Mexican guest workers to work legally in the
United States. Over the past three decades, ille-
gal immigration along the Southwest border has
increased, and enforcement efforts have intensi-
fied as a result. Border apprehensions have
grown from 200,000 in 1970 to more than 1.5
million in 1999.
The cumulative impact of this immigrant
flow is a sizable illegal immigrant population.
The undocumented immigrant population from
Mexico was estimated at 3.1 million in 1997.
1
Mexicans make up about 60 percent of the total
undocumented population of the United States,
and Central Americans from El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua make up
another 13 percent (U.S. INS 1999). Whereas
some undocumented immigrants arrive legally
and simply overstay their tourist visas, the
majority of illegal Mexican and Central American
immigrants residing in the United States cross
the border without documents. It is estimated
that the net inflow of illegal immigrants from
Mexico, excluding short-term cyclical migrants,
averaged about 202,000 immigrants per year
between 1987 and 1996.
2
This article evaluates the determinants of
illegal Mexico–U.S. migration and gives an over-
view of enforcement and policy responses. Many
observers, noting the large number of illegal im-
migrants, have concluded that border enforce-
ment provides little deterrent. Some research
supports this view. Singer and Massey (1998)
show declining apprehension rates along the
border in the 1980s and early 1990s. Other re-
search shows that apprehended migrants simply
attempt additional border crossings until they
succeed—also suggesting increased enforce-
ment has little impact (Kossoudji 1992).
On the other hand, there is evidence in-
creased border enforcement is correlated with
falling wages for young males in Mexican bor-
der cities (Hanson, Robertson, and Spilimbergo
1999). This could imply that tougher border
enforcement has the effect of trapping would-be
immigrants on the Mexican side of the border.
Publicized reports about the increase in migrant
deaths also imply that tougher border enforce-
ment sends migrants on circuitous routes into
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2000). In this article, I explore the timing and
pattern of substitution among border-crossing
sites. I also look at developments in the smug-
gling (coyote) industry, such as changes in
smuggler use rates and smugglers’ fees, to
assess the effectiveness of border enforcement
over the past thirty-five years.
Migration is the outcome of both push fac-
tors within Mexico and pull factors in the United
States. Migrant family networks and smugglers
have facilitated illegal immigration, while wage
and employment differentials have encouraged
it. Although early border enforcement had little
impact, more recent efforts are having an effect.
Early enforcement attempts fueled an increase
in the demand for smugglers, with no corre-
sponding rise in coyote prices. Only the most
recent enforcement initiatives, most significantly
Operations Hold-the-Line and Gatekeeper, have
been successful in reversing the thirty-year
decline in smugglers’ fees and moving migrants
to remote crossing points. Risks have risen
along with smugglers’ fees, as reflected in an
increasing number of crossing-related deaths
since 1995. In light of these developments, I
conclude that now is a good time for Mexican
and U.S. policymakers to consider a bilateral
labor and migration agreement.
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: 
DATA SOURCES AND TRENDS
To get an idea of the changes in illegal
immigration on the Southwest border, I rely 
on two data sources. The first is the Mexican
Migration Project (MMP 1999), collected in west-
ern Mexico between 1987 and 1997. Western
Mexico—particularly the states of Michoacán,
Jalisco, and Guanajuato—is a traditional source
of U.S.-bound migrants. The MMP survey asks
randomly sampled heads of households for
family, job, and migration histories.
3 The migra-
tion rate is depicted in Figure 1 and includes
both legal and illegal trips. As shown, migration
rates more than doubled between 1965 and
1995, rising from 3.7 percent to 7.5 percent by
the end of the sample period. Sustained in-
creases in migration are associated with the
1970s and the mid-1980s, with an all-time peak
of almost 10 percent reached in 1988.
The other data source on illegal immigra-
tion is Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) data on the number of illegal aliens ap-
prehended by the Border Patrol each year.
Although apprehensions also reflect the inten-
sity of enforcement, discussed in detail below,
the time series shown in Figure 2 is largely con-
sistent with the migration patterns observed in
the household survey data in Figure 1. Appre-
hensions rose from about 21,000 in 1960 to
more than 1.5 million in 1999, with steep in-
creases in the 1970s, in the mid-1980s leading
up to the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA), and again in 1994–96. For compara-
bility, I also plot the rate of illegal immigration
in the MMP sample for the years available.
Illegal immigration in the MMP sample is highly
correlated with apprehensions up until the early
1990s. As households drop out of the MMP data
(households are sampled only once) or are
legalized through amnesty under IRCA, the sam-
ple becomes less representative. This problem
becomes more severe after 1991.
Figure 1
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ORIGINS AND DETERMINANTS 
OF MEXICO–U.S. MIGRATION
The Bracero Program
Large-scale immigration from Mexico has
its roots in the Bracero Program, a guest-worker
program started in 1942 (Massey et al. 1987). 
It arranged for the temporary legal immigration
of workers from Mexico to the United States, in
part to cover U.S. labor shortages resulting from
World War II. Following the war, however, U.S.
farmers and fruit and vegetable growers suc-
cessfully lobbied the government to extend the
program through the 1950s. It was not until 1964
that organized labor’s call for an end to foreign
contract labor was heeded and the Bracero
Program was abandoned (Calavita 1992).
From 1942 to 1964, the Bracero Program
brought in an average of more than 200,000
workers annually (Calavita 1992). The majority
of braceros were concentrated in Texas, Cali-
fornia, Arkansas, Arizona, and New Mexico.
When the bracero agreement was terminated in
1964, it was under a cloud of controversy, and
consequently no worker exchange was put in
its place. The program’s abrupt end eventually
resulted in a new era of largely illegal immigra-
tion from Mexico. The new era had a slow start,
in part because of strong economic growth in
Mexico in the 1960s. Also, in 1965, Mexico insti-
tuted a border industrialization program that has
become known as the maquiladora program,
specifically intended to create jobs for laid-off
migrants.
4 Nevertheless, by the early 1970s, the
movement of Mexican migrants to the United
States was accelerating again.
Determinants of Illegal Immigration
The resumption of illegal immigration fol-
lowing the end of the Bracero Program illus-
trates the power of economic and social factors.
The links formed between employers, re-
cruiters, and migrant workers during the
Bracero period lowered the costs and risks of
migrating to the United States for work (Massey
et al. 1987). Key factors such as networks and
the availability of people smugglers known as
“coyotes” allow migration to rise. The under-
lying determinants of Mexico–U.S. migration,
however, are the higher wages and job avail-
ability in the United States. The policy backdrop
is also important. Laws that exist but are not
enforced, such as IRCA employer sanctions, sig-
nal tolerance for illegal immigration.
Networks
Although economic factors such as wage
differentials are considered paramount, they
cannot be acted upon if migration costs are pro-
hibitive. A first-time illegal migrant must over-
come significant fixed costs to obtain informa-
tion about the destination and how to make a
successful trip.
5 Immigration researchers have
found networks—family members and friends
with migration experience—as the most com-
mon way in which this crucial information is
transmitted to the potential migrant.
The Bracero Program laid the foundation
for mass illegal immigration partly through the
creation of networks and the dissemination of
information pertinent to Mexico–U.S. migration
and employment in U.S. labor markets. Since
then, networks have continued to expand, as
Figure 3 shows for sibling networks (defined as
having a sibling with U.S. migration experi-
ence). Nineteen percent of MMP households
had access to at least one sibling network in
1965, whereas 41 percent had access in 1991.
These same households averaged 1.7 sibling 
networks in 1965 and 2.3 in 1991. Moreover, 
an increasing proportion of sibling networks
settled permanently in the United States over
this period. In other words, both the quantity
and quality of migrant networks are changing.
Smugglers
Along with migrant networks, the avail-
ability of people smugglers, or coyotes as they
are commonly called, makes the cross-border
trip possible for many undocumented immi-
grants. Coyotes can be hired in a migrant’s
hometown or along the border and typically
accompany the migrant to his ultimate destina-
tion.
6 The smuggler’s fee, or “coyote price,” rep-
Figure 3
Access to Sibling Networks 
and Number of Sibling Networks, 1965–95
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resents a major cost of illegal immigration.
Interestingly, despite increased enforcement,
coyote prices were on a steep downward trend
during most of the sample period. By 1994, 
coyote prices averaged about $300—one-third
of 1965 prices. (Coyote prices are discussed in
more detail below.)
The most important reasons for the falling
coyote prices were the development of infra-
structure and free entry into the coyote industry.
Construction of infrastructure such as roads and
airports and the growth of twin cities along the
border, such as Tijuana/San Diego and Ciudad
Juárez/El Paso, made the border more access-
ible to travelers from Mexico’s interior. Before
1930, for example, only two railways connected
central Mexico with the U.S. border, and no
major roads connected the Mexican interior
with any U.S. border city (Scott 1982). Most
roads linking the interior to the border were
built between 1940 and 1960. Similarly, the
expansion of commercial air transport during
these years was dramatic. As a result, travel
times were significantly shortened, allowing
coyotes to charge less for their services.
Another factor in falling coyote prices has
been free entry into the industry. In theory, any
migrant who has undertaken an illegal border
crossing can use the experience to work as a
coyote. This implies that as illegal immigration
became more commonplace, more and more
migrants entered the smuggling trade.
7 More
competition among suppliers pushed prices
lower.
Wages
With networks and coyotes in place, the
costs of illegal immigration have decreased suf-
ficiently to allow potential migrants to respond
to changing factors such as relatively low
Mexican wages and economic downturns.
Massey and Espinosa (1997) and Orrenius
(1999) provide a comprehensive look at deter-
minants of Mexico–U.S. migration. Economic
downturns cause unemployment in cities, de-
press agricultural prices in the countryside, and
make loans difficult to repay. Figure 4 plots
Mexican GDP per capita (total GDP and agri-
cultural GDP) since 1965. The apparent surge in
Mexican emigration in the mid-1980s is consis-
tent with declines in real income at that time.
Mexican manufacturing wages tell a similar story
and, in 1999, were still below the peak levels
reached in 1981. Agricultural sector output,
although less volatile than national output, fell
throughout the latter half of the sample period.
Insurance and Capital Markets
Figure 4 suggests that low incomes and in-
termittent downturns or economic crises act as
push factors and generate out-migration. How-
ever, one strand of literature argues that simply
the risk of recession can also generate emigration
in good times. This theory emphasizes the need
to insure the household’s income against nega-
tive local shocks by coordinating the migration
and remittances of particular household mem-
bers in good and bad times (Stark and Bloom
1985). Underdeveloped capital markets also
make borrowing difficult or impossible for many
Mexicans. In surveys, migrants often cite the
need for capital to start a business, build a house,
repay a loan or fund a medical procedure as a
major reason for migrating to the United States.
Immigration Policy
Policies in both home and host countries
also affect the dynamics of migration. In Mexico,
the government’s failure to generate consistent
economic growth and stable financial institu-
tions leads to higher emigration. In the United
States (and many other countries), simply re-
stricting immigration to below the global de-
mand for visas creates an incentive for foreign-
ers to illegally immigrate. Other U.S. policies,
such as the generosity of public assistance pro-
grams and the availability of health care, also
have an impact. The two most significant U.S.
policies enacted in recent years, however, are
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).
IRCA was passed in 1986 in response to
increasing illegal immigration in the mid-1980s.
Economic conditions worsened in Mexico in the
Figure 4
Total and Agricultural Mexican GDP, 1965–97
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early 1980s, and by 1983 both the migration rate
and apprehensions began to rise. IRCA sought
to deter illegal immigration by allocating more
funds to the INS and border enforcement, im-
posing sanctions on employers who knowingly
hired undocumented workers, and creating an
agricultural guest worker program (H-2A). IRCA
also offered amnesty to agricultural workers and
long-term U.S. residents. The IRCA amnesty ulti-
mately legalized nearly three million illegal
immigrants—about two-thirds of them from
Mexico.
In the short term, IRCA’s passage is corre-
lated with an increase in total immigration but a
lowering of both the illegal immigration rate in
the MMP data and the number of border appre-
hensions (Figure 2) (Bean, Edmonston, and
Passel 1990; Orrenius 2000). IRCA may have
failed to stem illegal immigration in the medium
to long term in part because employer sanctions
are rarely enforced and the guest worker pro-
gram is too small and narrow to fill employers’
and migrant workers’ needs. The short-run
effects may have been the result of legalizing
the usual stream of illegal immigrants, many of
whom cycle regularly between the United States
and Mexico. Figure 5 shows the dramatic impact
the IRCA amnesty had on migrants in the MMP
sample, reducing the percentage of illegal cross-
ings from 77 percent in 1986 to 29 percent in 1989.
Passed ten years after IRCA’s implementa-
tion, IIRIRA followed up on some IRCA provi-
sions by further increasing penalties on smug-
glers as well as illegal entrants. IIRIRA also
mandated a doubling of the Border Patrol by
2001, increased penalties on document fraud,
streamlined deportation proceedings, limited
judicial review of deportation orders, and made
false attestation of citizenship punishable by up
to five years in prison. Meanwhile, welfare
reform legislation passed in 1996 denied illegal
immigrants and many legal immigrants access to
most public benefits. IIRIRA has probably not
had a strong effect on the volume of illegal
immigration, but it has made adjustment to legal
status more difficult for illegal aliens residing
here. The welfare reform and denial of benefits
such as food stamps have mostly affected legal
immigrants.
EVALUATING RECENT TRENDS 
IN BORDER ENFORCEMENT
U.S. authorities responded to rising illegal
immigration by increasing enforcement. As
shown in Figure 6, enforcement hours (meas-
ured by the number of hours Border Patrol
agents spend on linewatch duty) grew in three
phases over this period (Dunn 1996). In this
section, each enforcement phase is reviewed
with regard to its likely effect on the probability
of apprehension. Coyote use rates, coyote
prices, and migrant crossing patterns are prox-
ies for enforcement efficacy.
Three Phases of Enforcement
In early enforcement efforts, up until 1986,
linewatch hours lagged the influx of migrants.
Hours rose in the late 1970s when, in the face
of rising illegal immigration, the Carter adminis-
tration approved increased INS funding (Rosen-
blum 2000). Much of the additional money went
to hardware and equipment. In the next phase,
during the Reagan administration, border and
immigration issues took on heightened urgency,
and the passage of IRCA in 1986 marked a turn-
Figure 5
Illegal Crossings, 1965–96
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ing point for border enforcement and for immi-
gration policy more generally. A large portion 
of the 33 percent increase in INS funding was
earmarked for the Border Patrol, and the effect
on linewatch hours is apparent in Figure 6.
Congress also strengthened penalties against
migrant smugglers.
As illegal immigration began to grow
again in the early 1990s, yet another enforce-
ment initiative was undertaken. The third phase
of enforcement, which started in 1993 and used
site-specific crackdowns, marked by far the
biggest increase in linewatch hours. The objec-
tive was to make illegal immigration costly by
diverting illegal traffic out of border cities and
away from roads and buildings (U.S. GAO
1999b). Agents took up fixed positions along
commonly used paths within urban areas. Along
with fencing and surveillance equipment, this
forced illegal migrants away from densely pop-
ulated areas. Once in remote areas, the illegal
aliens could be more easily spotted and
detained by the Border Patrol.
8
The strategy was first implemented in El
Paso (Operation Hold-the-Line), then in 1994 
in San Diego (Operation Gatekeeper) and
Nogales, Arizona (Operation Safeguard), and last
in 1997 in South Texas (Operation Rio Grande).
As a result, between 1993 and 1997, the budget
for enforcement along the Southwest boundary
more than doubled. The number of Border
Patrol agents rose from 4,200 in 1994 to 7,700 in
1999 (U.S. GAO 1999a).
The Evidence on Smuggler Use Rates 
and Smuggling Fees
To deter illegal immigration, heightened
border vigilance must raise the costs migrants
face. This is usually done by increasing the
probability of apprehension (but can also be
accomplished by raising other risks to the
migrant such as the probability of injury or
death). Has the probability of being appre-
hended, and hence the cost and risk to the
migrant, increased during the enforcement peri-
ods under study?
Apprehension probability cannot be directly
measured because the number of illegal immi-
grants attempting crossings is unknown.
9
Apprehensions could be rising because of in-
creased numbers of immigrants and not because
of increased probability of capture. An alterna-
tive measure of changes in the probability of
apprehension is changes in related variables not
directly affected by the volume of illegal immi-
gration, for example, illegal immigrants’ propen-
sity to hire coyotes. Migrants should be more
likely to use a coyote when they perceive a
higher chance of apprehension from attempting
a crossing on their own. Another related vari-
able is the price coyotes charge. Coyote prices
should rise with apprehension probabilities, all
other things the same, since the risk to the
smuggler increases with the likelihood of get-
ting caught.
The bars in Figure 7 plot the percentage of
illegal immigrants in the survey data that hired
coyotes in each year. Coyote use increased
steeply in 1970 and trended upward for the rest
of the decade. By 1979, more than 70 percent of
illegal immigrants in the sample were hiring
coyotes. After leveling off in the early 1980s,
coyote use rates trended slightly upward in the
early years of IRCA (1986–1990). This pattern
provides some evidence that, despite the
increase in overall illegal immigration, costs to
migrants rose during the first two enforcement
phases. Figure 7 also illustrates, however, that
increases in the supply of smugglers outpaced
increases in the demand for smugglers, since
prices fell despite higher use rates. In real terms
(1994 dollars), the median reported coyote price
fell from more than $900 in 1965 to about $300
in 1994. By 1996–1997, however, the coyote
price trended upward again. Higher post-1994
prices are consistent with an impact of height-
ened enforcement on smuggling fees.
Coyote use rates peak in the survey data
in 1996. Because the MMP sample becomes
thinner at the end of the sample period, the last
data point is slightly less reliable. In any case,
anecdotal evidence supports the premise that
by 1995, the border had become much harder
to cross. In fact, the most recent border initia-
tive, the series of site-specific crackdowns start-
Figure 7
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ing with Operations Hold-the-Line and Gate-
keeper, has probably been the most successful
enforcement effort to date. For the first time,
anecdotes of border crossers being appre-
hended with such frequency that they turn
back, giving up their hopes of reaching the
United States, are common. Enforcement hours
and apprehension statistics are at all-time highs
and coyote prices are increasing for the first
time in more than thirty years.
The New Enforcement Strategy 
and the Change in Crossing Sites
Another telling sign that recent crack-
downs are a deterrent is the disruption of long-
standing border-crossing patterns. Immigrants
today shun formerly popular crossing points in
California in favor of Texas and Arizona. Within
states, the change is also noticeable. In Cali-
fornia, migrants choose to cross the harsh
deserts of El Centro rather than risk a crossing
south of San Diego. In Texas, migrants are less
likely to attempt an El Paso crossing, preferring
to cross farther south in Texas through Laredo,
McAllen, Brownsville, and most recently, Del Rio.
Interstate Reallocation of Migrants
As home to most of the U.S. border with
Mexico, Texas historically has been the primary
site of economic and cultural exchanges be-
tween the two countries. In 1900, the popula-
tion of California was only half that of Texas,
and the California–Mexico border was largely
unpopulated (Lorey 1999). After the Depression,
however, California overtook Texas in both eco-
nomic and population growth. An enormous
westward migration ensued, within both the
United States and Mexico, with the majority of
movers headed toward California. In Mexico,
cities along the way, such as Mexicali and
Tijuana, began to grow.
From the survey data in Figure 8, we can
see that from one-half to three-fourths of all
border crossings between 1965 and 1990 were
into California. Following IRCA, there was a
decline in the fraction of crossings into
California and a corresponding increase in the
propensity to cross into Texas. These trends
intensified following the implementation of
Operation Gatekeeper. Gatekeeper also led to
increased crossings into Arizona, although this
fact is not obvious from patterns in the MMP
data (it is clear from the INS apprehensions
data). The empirical trends are consistent with
the interpretation that, with the enactment of
IRCA and Gatekeeper, border enforcement in
California became more effective than Texas
enforcement. Border crossers responded by
shifting to Texas and Arizona.
Intrastate Reallocation of Migrants
Within Texas the changes are equally
striking. Looking at the data in Figure 9, the
increase in Texas crossings beginning in 1990 is
almost entirely concentrated in the El Paso sec-
tor. The resumption of crossings in El Paso fol-
lowing IRCA was an important factor in the
decision to implement Operation Hold-the-Line.
The data reveal the impact of the 1993 crack-
down with a 75 percent decrease in apprehen-
sions within one year. The subsequent rise in
apprehensions in the other Texas sectors, how-
ever, suggests migrants responded by crossing
farther south. The change in preferred border-
crossing sites is particularly noticeable following
Figure 8
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’99 ’96 ’93 ’90 ’87 ’84 ’81 ’78 ’75 ’72 ’69 ’66 ’63 ’60
SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service.9 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 2001
the December 1994 peso crash. Apprehensions
in the McAllen–Laredo sector rose to unprece-
dented levels after 1995.
Border-Crossing Deaths
A specific intention of the new border
enforcement strategy has been to eliminate ille-
gal alien traffic from city centers. The conse-
quence has been to divert migrants into more
sparsely populated areas. Illegal immigrants
today cross through inhospitable terrain and
expose themselves to dangerous climactic ex-
tremes far more than they did ten or twenty
years ago. Critics of the border offensives claim
that injuries and deaths along the border are at
an all-time high as a result. Rosenblum (2000)
cites the number of crossing-related deaths at
324 in 1999, up from single digits before 1995.
Deaths are believed to have numbered 388 in
2000. The Mexican estimate is 430.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
Policymakers face difficult choices on the
issue of immigration. Just as the individual
migrant faces costs and benefits from migrating,
host (home) countries experience costs and
benefits from immigration (emigration). Host
countries often fight illegal immigration to min-
imize the fiscal burden of immigrants, to limit
workplace competition for natives, and to heed
native concerns about issues ranging from
immigrant assimilation to cultural and linguistic
erosion. At the same time, policymakers have
come to understand migrant workers’ role in a
growing economy. In the U.S. case, authori-
ties seem unwilling to incur the economic 
consequences of ending illegal immigration.
Consequently, IRCA-imposed sanctions against
employers who hire undocumented workers are
rarely enforced. Moreover, the INS has largely
abandoned its former tactic of work-site raids,
and its de facto policy since 1997 has been
“once you are in, you are in.”
10
The outcome of the two opposing forces
has been a steady stream of illegal aliens.
Foreign policy toward Mexico seems to imply,
however, that large and sudden changes in that
stream are undesirable. The loan bailout of 1995
was partly defended on the grounds that it
would slow the Mexican out-migration resulting
from the peso’s 1994 crash. IRCA was similarly
intended to defend against the fallout of
Mexico’s debt crisis in the 1980s. NAFTA propo-
nents also argued that improved economic con-
ditions, attained through trade, would generate
less emigration from Mexico.
On the Mexican side, policymakers face a
different dilemma, although there are pros and
cons to Mexico–U.S. migration for Mexico as
well. The out-migration of Mexican citizens
brings in $4 billion to $7 billion in remittances
each year, with funds flowing to some of the
country’s most poverty-stricken areas. Emigrants
are the third-largest source of foreign reserves
after trade and tourism. Emigration has reduced
the pressure on politicians in handling eco-
nomic crises at the local and national levels.
However, Mexico has lost millions of working-
age men and women to the United States. At the
local level, the impact of mass emigration has
been severe in places. Villages and towns have
been depopulated. In years of economic
growth, labor markets have had to adjust, partly
through the rising labor force participation of
women.
For Mexican policymakers, the best-case
emigration scenario might be a population of
emigrants who leave in bad times, remit lots of
cash, and come home in good times to work,
invest, and run businesses. The policy implica-
tion is for Mexico to foster closer ties with the
emigrant community and encourage the United
States to allow more border-crossing mobility.
This view is seemingly shared by Mexican
President Vicente Fox, who proposes a renewal
of bilateral migration agreements with the
United States and suggests a border that would
allow for the freer movement of both people
and goods. One perverse outcome of the border
crackdown and other U.S. immigration laws 
has been to discourage illegal immigrants who
used to cycle in and out from returning home
(Orrenius 2000). From both countries’ perspec-
tives, a program incorporating temporary, work-
based migration of Mexicans to the United
States may prove the most beneficial arrange-
ment (Orrenius and Viard 2000).
11 This would
limit the fiscal impact on U.S. taxpayers and
allow Mexican migrant workers to keep their
Mexican residences and cycle freely between
the two countries.
CONCLUSION
Since World War II, boundaries between
Mexico and the United States have diminished.
A hundred years ago, wage differences were 
as large as they are today, yet there was virtu-
ally no migration between the two countries.
Exchange of people and goods was limited 
by distance, the lack of roads and airplanes, a
paucity of information, and linguistic and cul-
tural differences. Today, after fifty years of large-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 10
scale migration and settlement, the  scenario is
vastly different, and Mexico–U.S. trade and
migration have grown significantly. The re-
sponse to trade has been positive, but the
response to illegal immigration has been a cor-
responding increase in the intensity of border
enforcement.
Early enforcement efforts in the 1970s and
1980s were largely ineffectual. They succeeded
in raising coyote use rates among migrants,
which created a flourishing smuggling industry
offering a steadily decreasing fee schedule. The
more recent enforcement initiatives have been
successful, however, resulting in higher coyote
prices and possibly higher rates of discouraged
migrants who give up trying to cross the border.
Additional evidence is the change in migrant
crossing patterns. When one site has been cho-
sen for a crackdown, the effect has been almost
immediate, as migrants have responded by
crossing elsewhere. Migrants currently shun for-
merly popular crossing points such as San
Diego and El Paso in favor of more remote
routes. The inter- and intrastate reallocation of
migrants is apparent in both INS apprehensions
data and Mexican survey data. Unfortunately, 
as border-crossing options have been reduced,
migrants are risking more to make it to the
United States. The result has been a record
number of crossing-related deaths.
The controversy over border enforce-
ment’s impact on illegal immigration has led
naturally to more debate on the larger question,
namely the costs and benefits of illegal immi-
gration. There are policy instruments that would
allow both countries to garner the benefits of
Mexico–U.S. migration while mitigating the
costs. One of these is the development of bi-
lateral migrant worker agreements that would
provide for the legal and temporary entry of
Mexican workers into the U.S. labor market.
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1 This number does not include the estimated 2.8 
million illegal immigrants who were given legal resi-
dency under the 1986 amnesty provision of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act. See the report
entitled “Annual Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population Residing in the United States
and Components of Change: 1987–1997,”
http://wwwa.house.gov/lamarsmith.
2 The number of entries into the Mexican-born unautho-
rized-resident population is estimated at 330,000 
per year. (See the report referenced in footnote 1). 
The difference is due to emigration, status adjustment,
deportation, and death.
3 The migration history includes number, timing, and
destination of trips; legal status on trip; mode of
crossing (alone, with family, or with smuggler); and
amount of smuggler’s fee. The sample is selected on
male household heads aged 15–65.
4 Initially, maquiladoras largely employed female
workers. As a result, the border industrialization
program did little to help employ displaced braceros 
(Gruben 1990).
5 In an expected utility framework, the risk-averse
migrant suffers disutility from the uncertainty surround-
ing a trip to an unknown destination and involving an
illegal border crossing. The perceived risks are
therefore a migration deterrent.
6 Spener (forthcoming) describes the smuggler’s role
and methods in more detail.
7 The increased drug trade in the 1980s may have lured
more people into the smuggling trade.
8 According to agents, this strategy has worked less
well where vegetation hides the migrant—as in Laredo
and the lower Rio Grande Valley.
9 Despite these difficulties, Singer and Massey (1998)
developed estimates of the probability of apprehen-
sion. They find that the average (1965–92) probability
of apprehension is 0.33 and that apprehension
probabilities peaked in the late 1970s but have
declined since.
10 Internal enforcement since 1997 has focused on the
apprehension and deportation of criminal immigrants.
11 The guest worker program proposed by Sen. Phil
Gramm incorporates some of these ideas, including
issuing temporary visas to Mexican nationals working
illegally in the United States.
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